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ABSTRACT
The increasing role of recommender systems in many aspects of
society makes it essential to consider how such systems may impact
social good. Various modifications to recommendation algorithms
have been proposed to improve their performance for specific so-
cially relevant measures. However, previous proposals are often
not easily adapted to different measures, and they generally require
the ability to modify either existing system inputs, the system’s
algorithm, or the system’s outputs. As an alternative, in this paper
we introduce the idea of improving the social desirability of rec-
ommender system outputs by adding more data to the input, an
approach we view as providing ‘antidote’ data to the system.We for-
malize the antidote data problem, and develop optimization-based
solutions. We take as our model system the matrix factorization
approach to recommendation, and we propose a set of measures to
capture the polarization or fairness of recommendations. We then
show how to generate antidote data for each measure, pointing
out a number of computational efficiencies, and discuss the impact
on overall system accuracy. Our experiments show that a modest
budget for antidote data can lead to significant improvements in
the polarization or fairness of recommendations.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recommender systems are at the core of many online platforms
that influence the choices we make in our daily lives ranging from
what news we read (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) and whose products
and services we buy (e.g., Amazon, Uber, Netflix) to whom we meet
(e.g., OKCupid, Tinder). As users increasingly rely on recommender
systems to make life-affecting choices, concerns are being raised
about their inadvertent potential for social harm. Recently, studies
have shown how recommender systems predicting user preferences
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might offer unfair or unequal quality of service to indvidual (or
groups of) users [5, 8] or lead to societal polarization by increasing
the divergence between preferences of individual (or groups of)
users [13].
Collaborative filtering recommender systems rely on user-
provided data to learn models that are used to predict unknown
user preferences. As a result, the recommendations made by such
systems may carry undesired properties which are inherent in the
observed data. A natural approach then is to consider transforma-
tions of input data that ameliorate those properties.
In this paper we explore a new approach. Rather than trans-
forming the system’s exisiting input data, we investigate whether
simply augmenting the input with additional data can improve the
social desirability of the resulting recommendations. We explore
this question by developing a generic framework that can be used
to improve a variety of socially relevant properties of recommender
systems. Our framework turns a technique that has previously been
thought of as anti-social attacks on learning systems into a method
with socially desirable outcomes.
As a strategy for improving recommendations, the data aug-
mentation approach has multiple advantages. Adding new input
data may be easier than modifying existing data inputs, as when a
system is already running. Additional data can be provided to the
system by a third-party who does not need the ability to modify
the system’s existing input, nor the ability to modify the system’s
algorithms. Further, the approach is applicable to a wide range of
socially relevant properties of a system – essentially any property
that can be expressed as a differentiable function of the systems
inputs (ratings) and/or outputs (predictions).
The framework we develop starts from an existing matrix-
factorization recommender system organized according to users
and items, that has already been trained with some input (ratings)
data. We consider the addition to the system of new users who
provide ratings of existing items. The new users’ ratings are chosen
according to our framework, so as to improve a socially relevant
property of the recommendations that are provided to the original
users. We call the additional ratings provided ‘antidote’ data (by
analogy to existing work studying data poisoning).
In this paper we instantiate the framework by proposing met-
rics that capture the polarization and unfairness of the system’s
recommendations. These metrics build on and extend previous
proposals, and include measures of both individual and group un-
fairness. We show how to generate antidote data for these metrics,
and we present a number of computational efficiencies that can
be exploited. In the process we consider the relationship between
improvements to socially-relevant measures and changes to overall
system accuracy. Finally, we show that the small amounts of anti-
dote data (typically on the order of 1% new users) can generate a
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dramatic improvement (on the order of 50%) in the polarization or
the fairness of the system’s recommendations.
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we first discuss how our measures of fairness and
polarization for recommender systems relate to those discussed
in prior works. Later, we describe how we leverage insights and
methods explored in adversarial machine learning to cause social
harm towards social good in recommender systems.
Fairness in machine learning and recommender systems:
The past years havewitnessed a growing awareness about the poten-
tial for social harm by the use of machine learning algorithms in life-
affecting decision making scenarios [2, 7]. In response, researchers
have proposed numerous notions and measures of fairness for
machine learning tasks as varied as classification [17, 35, 36, 39],
regression [3], ranking [6, 32, 38], and set selection [10]. These
proposed notions fall under two broad categoies: those measuring
unfairness at the level of individual users and those that measure un-
fairness at the level of user groups [14]. The group-level unfairness
measures can be further sub-divided into those that prohibit the
use of information related to a user’s sensitive group membership
when making predictions and those that require users belonging to
different sensitive groups to receive, on average, equal quality of
service. The quality of service received by a user can in turn be mea-
sured either conditioned or unconditioned on the service outcomes
deserved by the user.
Compared to learning tasks such as classification and regression,
few studies have explored fairness notions in the context of rec-
ommender systems. Recently, Burke et al. [8] observed that recom-
mender systems predicting user preferences over items would have
to consider fairness from two-sides namely, from the perspective of
users receiving the recommendations and from the perspective of
items being recommended. Some of the early works by Kamishima
et. al. [22–24] focussed on notions of group-level fairness, where the
learning model is modified to ensure that item recommendations
are independent of users’ features revealing sensitive group mem-
bership such as race and gender. More recently, Beutel et. al. [5]
and Yao et. al. [34] have defined notions of group-level fairness in
recommender systems based on the accuracy of predictions across
different groupings of users or items.
Novel Contributions: Here, we not only build upon the group-
level notions of fariness proposed by Beutel and Yao (by general-
izing them to scenarios with more than two groups), but we also
extend them to individual-level. We further note that our fairness
notions can be applied either from the perspective of users or items.
Mechanims for fair machine learning and recommender
systems: Prior works have explored a number of approaches to
incorporating fairness in learning models and recommender sys-
tems. These approaches can be broadly categorized into those that
rely on (i) pre-processing, i.e., transform the training data to reduce
the potential for unfair outcomes when using traditional learning
models [9, 21], (ii) in-processing, i.e., change the learning objectives
and models to ensure fair outcomes even using unmodified training
data [1, 25], and (iii) post-processing, i.e., modify potentially unfair
outcomes from existing pre-trained learning models [12, 17].
Novel Contributions: In this paper, we explore a different ap-
proach to incorporating our fairness notions in recommender sys-
tems. Our approach is in contrast to existing approaches to fair
recommendations that primarily rely on in-processing [8, 23]. Un-
like in-processing approaches, our approach does not require us
to modify the recommendation algorithm for each of our desired
notions of fairness.
Leveraging adversarial machine learning for social good:
Our approach relies on methods that have been traditionally used
in adversarial learning literature to cause social harm [20]. Our
key insight is that we can retarget adversarial methods designed to
“poison” training data and cause social harm to generate “antidote”
training data for social good. Specifically, our antidote data genera-
tion methods are inspired by prior work on data poisoning attacks
on factorization-based collaborative filtering [26].
Most pre-processing approaches target learning new fair (latent
and transformed) representations of original data. Recently, Beu-
tel et. al. [4] leveraged adversarial training procedures to remove
information about sensitive group membership from the latent rep-
resentations learned by a neural network. In contrast, our approach
leaves the original training data untouched and instead adds new
antidote data to achieve fairness objectives. As our evaluation re-
sults presented later in the paper will show, by leaving the original
training data unmodified, our approach also achieves good over-
all prediction accuracy (the traditional objective of recommender
algorithms).
Polarization: Polarization refers to the degree to which opin-
ions, views, and sentiments diverge within a population. Several
prior works have raised and explored concerns that recommender
systems might increase societal polarization by tailoring recommen-
dations to individual user’s preferences and trapping users in their
own “personalized filter bubbles” [15, 31]. Dandekar et. al [13] show
how many traditional recommender algorithms used on Internet
platforms can lead to polarization of user opinions in society.
Novel Contributions:We propose to measure the polarization
of a recommender system as the extent to which predicted ratings
for items vary (diverge) across users. Our polarization metric is con-
sistent with those proposed in [13, 27]. We show how our antidote
data generation framework can be used to target reducing (or in
certain scenarios, increasing) polarization in predicted ratings.
3 OPTIMAL ANTIDOTE DATA PROBLEM
We start by presenting the system setup, notation, and problem
definition. Assume X ∈ Rn×d is a partially observed rating matrix
ofn users andd items such that element xi j denotes the rating given
by user i to item j . Let Ω be the set of indices of known ratings in X.
Also Ωi denotes the indices of known item ratings for user i , and
Ωj denotes the indices of known user ratings for item j.
For a matrix A, PΩ(A) is a matrix whose elements at (i, j) ∈ Ω are
ai j and zero elsewhere. Similarly, for a vector a, PΩj (a) is a vector
whose elements at i ∈ Ωj are the corresponding elements of a and
zero elsewhere. Throughout the paper, we denote the column j of
A by the vector aj and the row i of A by the vector ai . All vectors
are column vectors.
We assume a factorization based collaborative filtering algorithm
is applied to estimate the unknown ratings in X, i.e., for each user i
!
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Figure 1: The effect of antidote data on a matrix factorization system. Ini-
tially the system learns factors U and V from a partially observed
rating matrix X. The latent factors are then used to find the esti-
mated rating matrix Xˆ which is an input to the socially relevant
metric R. Adding antidote ratings X˜ introduces the new user latent
factor U˜ and modifies the item latent factor V, generating a new Xˆ
that improves R(Xˆ).
and item j we find ℓ-dimensional representations ui and vj such
that ℓ << min(n,d) and the rating xi j is modeled by xi j ≈ u⊺i vj .
More specifically, we consider a factorization algorithm Θ that
finds factors U ∈ Rℓ×n and V ∈ Rℓ×d by solving the following
optimization problem:
argmin
U,V
| |PΩ(X − U⊺V)| |2F + λ(| |U| |2F + | |V| |2F ) (1)
where columns of U are the user latent vectors, and columns of V
are the item latent vectors. The first term in 1 denotes the estimation
error over known elements of X and the second term is an ℓ2-norm
regularizer added to avoid overfitting. The unknown ratings are
then estimated by setting Xˆ = U⊺V.
We can think of our factorization algorithm as a function that
maps a partially observed rating matrix X to matrices U and V, and
has additional parameters ℓ and λ, i.e, Θℓ,λ(X) = (U,V). We assume
that the factorization rank and the regularizer parameter are set in
a validation phase and remain fixed afterwards and we use Θ(X)
and Θℓ,λ(X) interchangeably throughout the paper.
We use R to denote the socially relevant objective function that
we seek to optimize by adding antidote data. R is a function of
estimated ratings Xˆ and possibly (depending on the objective) other
parameters such as original ratings, user labels, etc. For example,
consider an objective that minimizes the difference of average es-
timation errors between two groups of users. In that case, R is a
function defined over X, Xˆ, and another parameter that indicates
the group membership of each user. The specific objective func-
tions we study in this paper are presented in Section 5. Now we
can formally state the optimal antidote data problem:
Problem 1 (Optimal Antidote Problem). Given a partially
observed rating matrix X ∈ Rn×d , a budget n′ = αn, a factorization
algorithm Θℓ,λ , and an objective function R, find the antidote data
X˜ ∈ Rn′×d such that R is optimized when Θℓ,λ is applied jointly on
X and X˜.
Note that wemaywant to either maximize or minimizeR depend-
ing on the objective. Also, although in our notation X˜ corresponds
to a set of artificial users, we can apply problem 1 to generate a set
of artificial items by using the symmetry of the problem, i.e., by
transposing X.
Although some objective functions have additional parameters
such as the original observed ratings (X) or a list of group mem-
berships (which we denote K), adding antidote data only affects
the output of the factorization algorithm and hence the rating esti-
mations Xˆ. Therefore, we denote the general objective function by
R(Xˆ) instead of R(Xˆ,X,K) for notational convenience. Assuming
our goal is to minimize some objective function R, we can rewrite
problem 1 as:
argmin
X˜∈M
R(Xˆ) (2)
whereM ⊂ Rn′×d is the set of feasible antidote data matrices.
Let Θ(X; X˜) denote the factorization algorithm when applied
jointly on the original and the antidote data. In this case, the output
consists of the item latent vectors forming the columns of factor
V ∈ Rℓ×d , and the user latent vectors which can be split into a
matrix of original users latent vectors U ∈ Rℓ×n , and a matrix
of antidote users latent vectors U˜ ∈ Rℓ×n′ ; therefore, we have
Θ(X; X˜) = (U, U˜,V).
Furthermore, Xˆ is a function of original users latent vectors and
item latent vectors1, i.e., Xˆ(Θ(X; X˜)) = U⊺V. This allows us to write
(2) in the explicit form:
argmin
X˜∈M
R(Xˆ(Θ(X; X˜))) (3)
In other words, we are looking for antidote data X˜ that modifies the
outputs of Θ such that Xˆ is modified to optimize R. Figure 1 shows
a schematic representation of the antidote data effect on matrix
factorization models. In the next section, we introduce an iterative
method to solve (3).
4 COMPUTING ANTIDOTE DATA
In this section we introduce the framework for generating anti-
dote data. We apply a projected gradient descent/ascent algorithm
(GD/GA) to optimize the antidote data with respect to a socially rele-
vant objective function. In section 4.1 we review a gradient descent
method, introduced in [26], for optimizing data poisoning attacks
on matrix factorization models, and which we adapt to optimize an-
tidote data. Then, in section 4.2 we show how the characteristics of
the antidote problem can be exploited for significant improvements
in algorithmic efficiency.
4.1 A Projected Gradient Descent Approach
In this section we describe a projected gradient descent algorithm to
solve the constrained optimization problem (2). A parallel approach
is taken in [26] for optimizing data poisoning attacks, which is
itself an instance of the more general machine teaching problem
introduced in [28]. We note that the framework introduced in [28]
can be used to extend the applicability of antidote data approach
beyond matrix factorization models.
The algorithm starts from an initial antidote data with size of
a given budget. At each iteration, the factorization algorithm is
applied jointly on the original data and the current antidote data
to find updated factors U,U˜,V, and estimated ratings Xˆ. Then the
gradient of the antidote utility with respect to antidote data at
the current point is computed and the algorithm chooses a step
size and updates the antidote data. After each update, a projection
function is applied to get a feasible solution. In this paper we only
1Note that here U and V are the users and items latent vectors after adding the antidote
data to the system, which can be different from initial U and V.
consider range constraints on the ratings, i.e., for each rating x˜i j we
assumeMmin < x˜i j < Mmax whereMmin andMmax indicate the
minimum and maximum feasible rating in the system. Therefore
the projection function simply truncates all the ratings in X˜ at
Mmin andMmax .
Algorithm 1 presents the details of our antidote data optimization
method. If the goal is to maximize R, we can apply a gradient ascent
algorithm by simply changing the sign of the gradient step in line
6. The learning algorithm Θℓ,λ is an input to Algorithm 1. This is
a realistic assumption in a white-box scenario, i.e., a party with
the full knowledge of the recommender system seeks to generate
antidote data, which is an important case. However, we emphasize
that there are settings in which other parties with only partial
knowledge of the system can successfully adopt the antidote data
approach as well. First of all, recent work [33] introduces a method
for estimating the hyper-parameters of a learning algorithm. Using
that method we need not input Θℓ,λ to Algorithm 1, instead only
providing the original factors (U,V). Moreover, in Section 6 we
introduce heuristic algorithms that require less information about
the recommender system than does Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Optimizing antidote data via projected gradient
descent
Input: Observed ratings X ∈ Rn×d , budget n′, factorization
algorithm Θℓ,λ , utility R , feasible setM
Output: Antidote data X˜
Initialization : initialize X˜(0) ∈ Rn′×d , t = 0
1 while convergence do
2 U, U˜, V = Θ(X; X˜(t ))
3 Xˆ = U⊺V
4 Compute ∇X˜R(Xˆ)
5 Find step size α
6 X˜(t+1) = X˜(t ) − α∇X˜R(Xˆ)
7 X˜(t+1) = PM(X˜(t+1))
8 t ← t + 1
9 return X˜(t )
In order to compute ∇X˜R(Xˆ) in line 4 of algorithm 1, we consider
the explicit form of the objective function given in (3). Applying
the chain rule we get:
∇X˜R(Xˆ) = ∇ΘR(Xˆ) ∇X˜(Θ(X; X˜)) (4)
∇X˜(Θ(X; X˜)) is the Jacobian matrix that contains partial deriva-
tives of factors (U, U˜,V) with respect to each element in X˜. These
partial derivatives can be approximately computed by exploiting
the KKT conditions of the factorization problem as explained in
[26] [28]. However, in section 4.2 we show cases where the full com-
putation of such partial derivatives is not required and we explain
how to derive the necessary elements.
By applying the chain rule one more time on ∇ΘR(Xˆ) we get:
∇X˜R(Xˆ) = ∇XˆR(Xˆ) ∇ΘXˆ(Θ) ∇X˜(Θ(X; X˜)) (5)
The first term in (5) is the gradient of the antidote utility with
respect to the estimated ratings. In this paper we only consider
differentiable utilities, as described in more detail in section 5.
The second term in (5) is the gradient of the estimated ratings
with respect to factors (U, U˜,V). This term is straighforward to
compute since the ratings are linear in each factor, i.e., Xˆ = U⊺V.
In this paper we do not make assumptions (e.g. convexity) about
the antidote utility other than being differentiable; the framework
is a general method to improve a socially relevant metric rather
than one that seeks the global optimum of function R. However,
we note that introducing antidote objectives with certain provable
properties, which can provide convergence guarantees or more
efficient ways to find the step size in Algorithm 1, is a potential
direction for future research.
4.2 Efficient Computation of the Gradient Step
In this section we show how to further simplify (5) to make the
update step of Algorithm 1 more efficient.
First, we write ∇ΘXˆ(Θ) in terms of the block matrices that con-
tain the partial derivatives of the estimated ratings in Xˆwith respect
to each factor U, U˜,V, i.e.2,
[
∂Xˆ
∂U ,
∂Xˆ
∂U˜
, ∂Xˆ∂V
]
. Notice that Xˆ = U⊺V
does not depend on U˜ and therefore ∂Xˆ
∂U˜
= 0.
Furthermore, we write ∇X˜(Θ(X; X˜)) in terms of the block matri-
ces that contain the partial derivatives of each factor U, U˜,V with
respect to each element in X˜, i.e.,
[
( ∂U
∂X˜
)⊺, ( ∂U˜
∂X˜
)⊺, ( ∂V
∂X˜
)⊺
]⊺
. Assum-
ing that an infinitesimal change in x˜i j only results in first order
updates in vectors u˜i and vj , we get ∂U
∂X˜
= 0.
Exploiting the fact that ∂U
∂X˜
= ∂Xˆ
∂U˜
= 0, we can simplify (5) to:
∇X˜R(Xˆ) = ∇XˆR(Xˆ)
∂Xˆ
∂V
∂V
∂X˜
(6)
Now we derive ∂R(Xˆ)∂x˜i j for each element of the antidote data x˜i j . Let
v1, . . . , vd be the item vectors forming the columns ofV . Then start-
ing from the last term in (6) and assuming first order updates, we
know that ∂vk∂x˜i j is non-zero only if k = j and can be approximately
computed as3:
∂vj
∂x˜i j
= (
∑
i ∈Ωj
uiu
⊺
i + U˜U˜
⊺ + λIℓ)−1u˜i (7)
On the other hand, ∂xˆlk∂vj = u
⊺
l if k = j and an ℓ-dimensional zero
vector otherwise. Therefore, we need to compute ∂R(Xˆ)∂xˆlk only for
k = j and we have:
∂R(Xˆ)
∂x˜i j
=
( n∑
l=1
∂R(Xˆ)
∂xˆl j
∂xˆl j
∂vj
)
∂vj
∂x˜i j
(8)
Let G be a matrix formed by reshaping ∇XˆR(Xˆ) into an n×d matrix
such that дi j = ∂R(Xˆ)∂xˆi j . Then we can write (8) as:
∂R(Xˆ)
∂x˜i j
= gj⊺U⊺S−1j u˜i (9)
2For matrices A ∈ Rm×n and B ∈ Rr×s , we use ∂A∂B to denote anmn × r s matrix
that contains the partial derivatives
∂ai j
∂bkℓ
for each ai j and bkℓ .
3Details are provided in appendix A.1.
where Sj =
∑
i ∈Ωj uiu
⊺
i + U˜U˜
⊺ + λIℓ .
By using (9) instead of the general formula in (5) we can signif-
icantly reduce the number of computations required for finding
the gradient of the utility function with respect to the antidote
data. Furthermore, the term gj⊺U⊺S−1j appears in all the partial
derivatives that correspond to elements in column j of X˜ and can
be precomputed in each iteration of the algorithm and reused for
computing partial derivatives with respect to different antidote
users.
5 SOCIAL OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS
The previous section developed a general framework for improving
various properties of recommender systems; in this section we show
how to apply that framework specifically to issues of polarization
and fairness.
As described in Section 2, polarization is the degree to which
opinions, views, and sentiments diverge within a population. Rec-
ommender systems can capture this effect through the ratings that
they present for items. To formalize this notion, we define polariza-
tion in terms of the variability of predicted ratings when compared
across users. In fact, we note that both very high variability, and
very low variability of ratings may be undesirable. In the case of
high variability, users have strongly divergent opinions, leading to
conflict. Recent analyses of the YouTube recommendation system
have suggested that it can enhance this effect [29, 30]. On the other
hand, the convergence of user preferences, i.e., very low variability
of ratings given to each item across users, corresponds to increased
homogeneity, an undesirable phenomenon that may occur as users
interact with a recommender system [11]. As a result, in what
follows we consider using antidote data in both ways: to either
increase or decrease polarization.
As also described in Section 2, unfairness is a topic of growing
interest in machine learning. Following the discussion in that sec-
tion, we consider a recommender system fair if it provides equal
quality of service (i.e., prediction accuracy) to all users or all groups
of users [36].
Next we formally define the metrics that specify the objective
functions associated with each of the above objectives. Since the
gradient of each objective function is used in the optimization algo-
rithm, for reproducibility we provide the details about derivation
of the gradients in appendix A.2.
5.1 Polarization
To capture polarization, we seek to measure the extent to which the
user ratings disagree. Thus, to measure user polarization we con-
sider the estimated ratings Xˆ, and we define the polarization metric
as the normalized sum of pairwise euclidean distances between
estimated user ratings, i.e., between rows of Xˆ. In particular:
Rpol (Xˆ) =
1
n2d
n∑
k=1
∑
l>k
| |xˆk − xˆl | |2 (10)
The normalization term 1n2d in (10) makes the polarizationmetric
identical to the following definition: 4
Rpol (Xˆ) =
1
d
d∑
j=1
σ 2j (11)
where σ 2j is the variance of estimated user ratings for item j. Thus
this polarization metric can be interpreted either as the average of
the variances of estimated ratings in each item, or equivalently as
the average user disagreement over all items.
5.2 Fairness
Individual fairness. For each user i , we define ℓi , the loss of user
i , as the mean squared estimation error over known ratings of user
i:
ℓi =
| |PΩi (xˆi − xi )| |22
|Ωi | (12)
Then we define the individual unfairness as the variance of the user
losses:5
Rindv (X, Xˆ) =
1
n2
n∑
k=1
∑
l>k
(ℓk − ℓl )2 (13)
To improve individual fairness, we seek to minimize Rindv .
Group fairness. Let I be the set of all users/items and G =
{G1 . . . ,Gд} be a partition of users/items into д groups, i.e., I =⋃
i ∈{1, ...,д }Gi . We define the loss of group i as the mean squared
estimation error over all known ratings in group i:
Li =
| |PΩGi (Xˆ − X)| |22
|ΩGi |
(14)
For a given partition G, we define the group unfairness as the
variance of all group losses:
Rдrp (X, Xˆ,G) = 1
д2
д∑
k=1
∑
l>k
(Lk − Ll )2 (15)
Again, to improve group fairness, we seek to minimize Rдrp .
5.3 Accuracy vs. Social Welfare
Adding antidote data to the system to improve a social utility will
also have an effect on the overall prediction accuracy. Previous
works have considered social objectives as regularizers or con-
straints added to the recommender model (eg, [8, 25, 37]), implying
a trade-off between the prediction accuracy and a social objective.
However, in the case of the metrics we define here, the rela-
tionship is not as simple. Considering polarization, we find that in
general, increasing or decreasing polarization will tend to decrease
system accuracy. In either case we find that system accuracy only
declines slightly in our experiments; we report on the specific val-
ues in Section 6. Considering either individual or group unfairness,
the situation is more subtle. Note that our unfairness metrics will
be exactly zero for a system with zero error (perfect accuracy). As a
4We can derive it by rewriting (10) as Rpol (Xˆ) = 1d
d∑
j=1
1
n2
n∑
k=1
∑
l>k
(xˆk j − xˆl j )2 .
5Note that for a set of equally likely values x1, . . . , xn the variance can be expressed
without referring to the mean as: 1
n2
∑
i
∑
j>i
(xi − x j )2 .
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Figure 2: Modifying user polarization.
result, it is possible that as the system decreases unfairness, overall
accuracy may either increase or decrease. We illustrate these effects
in our experiments in Section 6.
6 EFFECTIVENESS
In this section we use the tools developed in previous sections to
study the effectiveness of antidote data in varying the polariza-
tion and reducing the unfairness of a matrix-factorization based
recommender system.
We consider a recommender system that estimates unknown
ratings by solving the regularized matrix factorization problem
as defined by (1). We implemented an alternating least squares
algorithm [16, 19] to find the factors. We use the MovieLens 1M
dataset which contains around 1 million ratings of ∼4000 movies
made by ∼6000 users, with ratings on a 5-point scale [18]. We
choose the 1000 most frequently rated movies, and use different
subsets of users in different experiments as described below.
For each dataset we perform a validation process to choose the
hyper-parameters (ℓ, λ) so as to obtain realistic settings. The hyper-
parameters are selected based on the average root-mean-square
error (RMSE) of the factorization in multiple random splits of ob-
served ratings into training and validation sets. We assume that the
hyper-parameters are fixed during the antidote data generation pro-
cess since the antidote data is generated for a fixed recommender
system.
First we show the effectiveness of antidote data in modifying the
user polarization as defined in section 5.1. In section 6.2 we describe
different heuristics that can significantly speed up the construction
of antidote data. Finally, section 6.3 demonstrates the effectiveness
of applying antidote data for improving fairness.
6.1 Polarization
To explore modifying user polarization, we choose a random subset
of 1000 users yielding a matrix in which 11% of the elements are
known. As previously mentioned, it may be of interest to either
increase or decrease the polarization metric in different scenarios.
We present an example for each case. We do so by taking advan-
tage of the fact that different hyperparameter combinations can
yield models that are very close in overall accuracy but that differ
significantly with respect to initial user polarization in the system.
In particular, we observe that the average validation RMSE over
ten random splits of observed ratings into training and validation
sets for (rank = 8, λ = 10) is 0.87 and for (rank = 4, λ = 0.1)
is 0.90. However, the polarization (Rpol ) of the estimated rating
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Figure 3: Improving fairness.
matrix for (rank = 8, λ = 10) is 0.2 whereas for (rank = 4, λ = 0.1)
the polarization goes up to 0.55. We use the former setting as
an example where the goal is to increase the polarization metric
(to avoid homogeneity), and the latter setting as an example of a
polarized system where the goal is to reduce polarization.
For each of the maximization and minimization objectives, we
compare the performance of the antidote data generation frame-
work with a baseline algorithm. When seeking to minimize polar-
ization, we use baseline_min. This algorithm tries to reduce the
variance of estimated ratings in each item by setting the ratings
given to the corresponding item in the antidote data to the average
of known ratings for that item in the original data. When seeking to
maximize polization, we use baseline_max. This algorithm gener-
ates antidote data by setting half of the user ratings in each item to
the maximum feasible rating value and the other half of the ratings
to the minimum feasible rating value.
Furthermore, we consider two different initializations for the
optimization process: in the case of GD(fixed init), all the ratings
in the initial antidote data are set to the same value. In the case of
GD(random init), we run the optimization multiple times starting
from random initializations and return the best solution. Figure 2
compares the effects of adding antidote data constructed by different
methods on polarization. After each injection of the antidote data,
the new polarization is computed using the original data only, i.e.,
we ignore the injected data in evaluating polarization. We present
our results for different budgets varying from a single antidote user
to 5% of the number of original users. We also show the effect of
ratings that are randomly generated over the feasible range, when
used as antidote data.
Our results show that the antidote data generation framework
can successfully either minimize or maximize polarization. Antidote
data generated by our method are considerably more effective than
the baseline algorithms as well as random data. We observe that a
2% budget is enough to reduce the initial polarization in a polarized
setting by 50% and increase the polarization in a less polarized
setting by 10%. Furthermore, we observe that random initialization
is more effective for minimizing polarization whereas initializing
all the antidote ratings from the same value is more effective for
maximizing polarization.
To better understand the effect of antidote data on user polariza-
tion, in Figure 4 we demonstrate the effect of antidote data with a
1% budget for the minimization case. Note that the effect on esti-
mation error of adding antidote data is negligible: RMSE of rating
estimations for known elements changes from 0.80 to 0.83. In other
words, antidote data modifies the prediction model such that its
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Figure 4: Minimizing polarization with 1% budget.
predictions still approximately agree with the known ratings but
the polarization of the new estimated rating matrix is significantly
different.
Figure 4a shows the distributions of per-item polarization (σ 2j
in (11)) along with Rpol (the distributional mean) before and after
antidote data injection. The figure shows that without antidote data,
a small set of items make large contributions to overall polarization
– they have quite high variance in ratings, shown by the long dis-
tributional tail. The addition of antidote data dramatically reduces
this effect, and also significantly lowers Rpol from 0.55 to 0.29.
Figure 4b shows the effect of adding antidote data on the esti-
mated ratings of Patch Adams (1998), one of the movies for which
the variance of estimated ratings is large before adding antidote
data. We observe that the distribution of known ratings for this
movie indicates a polarized case with two peaks at 2 and 4. The
initial rating estimations in this case lie in an interval that is much
larger than the range of observed ratings. Adding antidote data
modifies the extreme rating estimations; resulting in a unimodal
distribution over the range of original ratings.
While the goal of adding antidote data is to modify the system’s
predicted ratings, an important use case for such a system is to out-
put the top rated items as the system’s recomendations. Hence, it is
important to ask how modifying predicted ratings will change the
ranking of unrated items, i.e., the output of a top-k recommender
system. Therefore, we consider the top-k recommended items on a
per-user basis and measure the degree of change in the recommen-
dations before and after adding antidote data. We use the Jaccard
similarity of the sets of recommended items to measure this change.
Figure 4c shows the average of Jaccard similarities across all
users. Our results show that the antidote data significantly changes
the output of a top-k recommender system. For example, adding
1% additional antidote data changes the top-recommended item
for 84% of all users. We observe that, in general, as the number of
considered top items grows, the effect lessens (Jaccard similarity
grows). However, the changes in the set of recommended items are
still significant up to k = 30.
6.2 Heuristic Algorithms
In this section we introduce heuristic algorithms that dramatically
reduce the computational cost of antidote data generation. Notice
that the computational cost of Algorithm 1 is dominated by per-
forming the matrix factorization algorithm (evaluating Θ) in each
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Figure 5: Optimal antidote data with 0.5% budget.
pass through the gradient descent loop. The heuristics are designed
based on various approximations that can be made in different steps
of Algorithm 1 to minimize the number of times Θ is evaluated.
The approximations are motivated by certain patterns observed in
the antidote data generated by Algorithm 1.
Figure 5 shows the antidote data generated by GD(random init)
for minimizing polarization (Fig. 5a) and minimizing individual
unfairness (Fig. 5b). We observe that: (i) most of the ratings in the
resulting antidote data are equal to one of the boundary values in
the feasible set,Mmin orMmax (0 or 5 in our experiments), and (ii)
in the fairness case, most of the users (rows) in the antidote data
converge to a nearly-identical pattern of ratings over items, even if
they are initialized with different random values.
Based on the above observations, in our evaluations we consider
two heuristics for generating antidote data for fairness. The first
(heuristic1) offers considerable computational savings, and the
second (heuristic2) offers even more savings, while additionally
removing the need for access to the factorization algorithm or its
hyper-parameters (ℓ,λ)6.
heuristic1 reduces the number evaluations of Θ to a single
call by combining observations (i) and (ii). It works by considering
the addition of only a single row of antidote data, and computes
gradients for that row. Rather than performing gradient descent
over a series of small steps, it then simply sets each value in the
antidote data row to eitherMmin orMmax depending on the sign
of the gradient. It then replicates the resulting row as many times
as dictated by the antidote data budget.
In the case of heuristic2, in addition to using the above ob-
servations, we approximate the direction of the gradient without
6Pseudocodes are provided in appendix B.
Table 1: Effect of antidote data on individual unfairness Rindv in
the held-out ratings. Rindv before antidote is 0.1087.
Budget
Algorithm 1 0.5% 1% 2% 5%
GD(random init) 0.1086 0.1084 0.1054 0.1157 0.1086
GD(fixed init) 0.1086 0.1083 0.0929 0.0985 0.0968
heuristic1 0.1086 0.1084 0.0816 0.0800 0.0830
heuristic2 0.1086 0.1084 0.0817 0.0818 0.0811
the need to perform matrix factorization, given access to factors
U and V. In this case, access to the factorization algorithm or its
hyper-parameters is not required. Notice that (9) can be rewritten as
∂R(Xˆ)
∂x˜1j
= a⊺j bj where aj =
[
g⊺j U
⊺
]⊺
and bj = S−1j u˜1. For sufficient
level of regularization λ, we can approximate a⊺j bj ≈ ca⊺j 1ℓ where
c is a constant and 1ℓ is an ℓ-dimensional vector of 1’s. This leads
to a modification of heuristic1 in which all the values in column
j of the antidote data are set toMmin orMmax depending on the
sign of g⊺j U
⊺1ℓ .
6.3 Fairness
In this section we show how antidote data as generated by our
various algorithms improves fairness. We again use the MovieLens
dataset; to study group fairness, we group movies by genre as
specified in the dataset. In contrast to the case for polarization, the
fairness objective is a function of both the known and predicted user
ratings. Hence we choose the 1000 most active users and the 1000
most frequently rated movies. This gives us a rating matrix in which
∼36% of the elements are known. For this dataset we run the matrix
factorization algorithm with hyper-parameters (rank = 8, λ = 1).
To verify that adding antidote data improves the fairness of
unseen ratings, we hold out 20% of the known ratings per user
as a test set. We use the remaining data (training set) to generate
antidote data; we then measure the effectiveness of the resulting
antidote data in both training and test sets.
We start by assessing the effect of antidote data on fairness in the
training data. We show the impact of antidote data on individual
unfairness (Rindv ) in Figure 3a and on group unfairness (Rдrp ) in
Figure 3b. The figures compare the effect of antidote data as gener-
ated by four different algorithms: Algorithm 1 with two different
initializations as described in Section 6.1, and the two heuristic
algorithms introduced in Section 6.2.
The results show that all algorithms improve fairness consider-
ably. In fact most of the benefits of antidote data can be obtained
by only adding 1% additional users in the individual fairness case
and 0.5% additional users in the group fairness case. The figures
also show that the much simpler heuristics, in which all rows of
the antidote data are identical, are effective: for individual fairness,
they provide almost all the benefits of Algorithm 1 while for group
fairness they provide around half of the benefits of Algorithm 1.
Tables 1 and 2 show the resulting values of the individual and
group unfairness metrics in the test set after antidote data addition
for different budgets and different algorithms. We observe that
the antidote data generated to reduce unfairness in the training
data is also effective for reducing unfairness on the the held-out
Table 2: Effect of antidote data on group unfairness Rдrp in the
held-out ratings. Rдrp before antidote is 0.0088.
Budget
Algorithm 1 0.5% 1% 2% 5%
GD(random init) 0.0087 0.0035 0.0041 0.0042 0.0045
GD(fixed init) 0.0087 0.0042 0.0040 0.0040 0.0044
heuristic1 0.0087 0.0055 0.0056 0.0057 0.0058
heuristic2 0.0087 0.0055 0.0056 0.0057 0.0058
test data. The optimal value (minimum unfairness) in each table
is highlighted. We observe that even in the test set, a 2% budget
using heuristic1 can reduce individual unfairness by over 25%
(from 0.1087 to 0.0800), and group unfairness can be lowered by
more than 50% (from 0.0088 to 0.0035) using GD(random init) and
a 0.5% budget.
Training Test
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
2.00
R
M
S
E
Before After
(a) Individual fairness
0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05
RMSE before antidote
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
R
M
S
E
af
te
r
an
ti
d
ot
e
D
ocum
entary
H
orror
A
nim
ation
C
om
edy
W
ar
W
estern
Sci-F
i
D
ram
a
F
ilm
-N
oir
S
D
:0.036
SD:0.052
y
=
x
(b) Group fairness
Figure 6: Antidote data effect on fairness.
Figure 6 provides more insight into how adding antidote data
reduces individual and group unfairness. In each case, we consider
the setting that reaches the minimum unfairness in the test set as
presented in tables 1 and 2.
Figure 6a shows the effect of optimal antidote data on per-user
RMSEs. The figure demonstrates a number of points. First, adding
antidote data results in a model with less variation in per-user
RMSE of rating estimations in both training and test sets. Second,
a noticeable way in which adding antidote data improves fairness
is by reducing the magnitude of the outliers that drive unfairness
in both training and testing. Finally, the figure shows that in this
example adding antidote data actually improves overall accuracy
of the model predictions.
Figure 6b shows the effect of optimal antidote data on per-group
RMSE in the test set. For each group (genre) of movies, the corre-
sponding point shows the group’s RMSE before and after adding
antidote data. Additionally, the boxplots on each axis illustrate the
distribution of RMSE values across groups before and after adding
antidote data.
First, we observe that all points are below the line y = x , i.e.,
adding antidote data improves the prediction accuracy of all genres
and thus the overall accuracy of the model. Moreover, the boxplots
show that improvements in rating estimations are so that the cross-
group variability in RMSE is decreased to reach a fairer situation.
Finally, we see that outliers particularly benefit from addition of
antidote data; this can be seen as larger RMSE improvements in
genres that initially had larger RMSE. In particular, Documentary
andHorror have the largest prediction errors before adding antidote
data, and their RMSEs are the most improved (furthest belowy = x )
after adding antidote data.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper we propose a new strategy for improving the socially
relevant properties of a recommender system: adding antidote
data. We have presented an algorithmic framework for this
strategy and applied it to a range of socially important objectives.
Using this strategy, one does not need to modify the original
system input data or the system’s algorithm. We show that the
resulting framework can efficiently improve the polarization
or fairness properties of a recommender system. We conclude
that the developed framework can be a flexible and effective
approach to addressing the social impacts of a recommender system.
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A DERIVATION OF THE GRADIENTS
A.1 Derivation of ∂V
∂X˜
Let E be the value of the objective function in (1). Assuming that
the factorization algorithm finds a local optimum of E, we have
∂E
∂vj
= 0, which give us the following:
∑
i ∈Ωj
(xi j − u⊺i vj )ui +
n′∑
i=1
(x˜i j − u˜⊺i vj )u˜i = λvj (16)
From the above equation we can show that the following formula
for vj holds at a local optimum of E:
vj = (
∑
i ∈Ωj
uiu
⊺
i + U˜U˜
⊺ + λIℓ)−1(
∑
i ∈Ωj
xi jui +
n′∑
i=1
x˜i j u˜i ) (17)
Therefore, assuming that an infinitesimal change in x˜i j only results
in first order corrections we can write:
∂vj
∂x˜i j
= (
∑
i ∈Ωj
uiu
⊺
i + U˜U˜
⊺ + λIℓ)−1u˜i (18)
A.2 Gradients of the objective functions
Polarization
∂Rpol
∂xˆi j
=
2
n2d
∑
k,i
(xˆi j − xˆk j ) (19)
=
2
nd
(xˆi j − 1
n
n∑
k=1
xˆk j ) (20)
=
2
nd
(xˆi j − µ j ) (21)
where µ j is the average estimated rating for item j.
Individual fairness
For (i, j) ∈ Ω we have:
∂Rindv
∂xˆi j
=
1
n2
(
∑
k>i
2(ℓi − ℓk )
∂ℓi
∂xˆi j
+
∑
k<i
−2(ℓk − ℓi )
∂ℓi
∂xˆi j
) (22)
=
2
n2
∑
k,i
(ℓi − ℓk )
∂ℓi
∂xˆi j
(23)
=
4(xˆi j − xi j )
n2 |Ωi |
∑
k,i
(ℓi − ℓk ) (24)
=
4(xˆi j − xi j )
n |Ωi | (ℓi −
1
n
n∑
k=1
ℓk ) (25)
therefore,
∂Rindv
∂xˆi j
=
{ 4(xˆi j−xi j )
n |Ωi | (ℓi − µindv ) (i, j) ∈ Ω
0 (i, j) < Ω
(26)
where µindv is the average of user losses.
Group fairness
Assume G() is a function that maps each user/item to its group
label. For (i, j) ∈ Ω we have:
∂Rдrp
∂xˆi j
=
2
д2
∑
k,G(i)
(LG(i) − Lk )
∂LG(i)
∂xˆi j
(27)
=
4(xˆi j − xi j )
д2 |ΩG(i) |
∑
k,G(i)
(LG(i) − Lk ) (28)
=
4(xˆi j − xi j )
д |ΩG(i) |
(LG(i) −
1
д
д∑
k=1
Lk ) (29)
therefore,
∂Rдrp
∂xˆi j
=
{ 4(xˆi j−xi j )
д |ΩG(i ) | (LG(i) − µG ) (i, j) ∈ Ω
0 (i, j) < Ω
(30)
where µG is the average of group losses.
B HEURISITC ALGORITHMS
In this section we present the pseudocode of the heuristic algo-
rithms introduced in section 6.2 for generating antidote data to
improve individual and group fairness.
B.1 heuristic1
1. Start from a single antidote user x˜(0)1 .
2. Compute U, u˜1,V = Θ(X; x˜(0)1 ).
3. Compute ∂R(Xˆ)∂x˜1j for each item j using (9).
4. If ∂R(Xˆ)∂x˜1j > 0 set x˜1j = Mmin Else set x˜1j = Mmax .
5. Copy x˜1 α times to generate X˜ for a given budget α .
B.2 heuristic2
1. Compute ∇XˆR(Xˆ) and reshape it into an n × d matrix G.
2. Set d[j] = g⊺j U⊺1ℓ for each item j using G and the original
factor U.
3. If d[j] > 0 set x˜1j = Mmin Else set x˜1j = Mmax .
4. Copy x˜1 α times to generate X˜ for a given budget α .
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